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and Risk Premium
This paper uses a combination of a monetary macroeconomic model and a
standard microeconomic noise trader model to analyze the effect of capital controls
that take the form of a price control and can, thus, be modeled as a tax. We
examine the effects on the exchange rate, the domestic interest rate, and the
microstructure of the foreign exchange market in a small open economy. We
identify two effects which work in opposite directions: On the on hand, capital
controls lower the variability of the exchange rate and this reduces the risk premium
as well as the domestic interest rate. On the other hand, capital controls lessen
the number of noise traders and, therefore, the risk bearing capacity of the market.
This leads to higher interest rates and decreases the growth potential of the
economy. Under certain conditions the implementation of a capital control can
lead to an improved market outcome but it is also possible that a zero capital
control is optimal.
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Abstract
This paper uses a combination of a monetary macroeconomic
model and a standard microeconomic noise trader model to analyze
the eﬀect of capital controls that take the form of a price control
and can, thus, be modeled as a tax. We examine the eﬀects on the
exchange rate, the domestic interest rate, and the microstructure of
the foreign exchange market in a small open economy. We identify
two eﬀects which work in opposite directions: On the one hand, cap-
ital controls lower the variability of the exchange rate and reduces
the risk premium as well as the domestic interest rate. On the other
hand, capital controls reduce the number of noise traders and, there-
fore, the risk bearing capacity of the market. This leads to higher
interest rates and reduces the growth potential of the economy. Un-
der certain conditions the implementation of a capital control can
lead to an improved market outcome but it is also possible that a
zero capital control is optimal.
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Germany1 Motivation of the Paper
Recent turbulence in world ﬁnancial markets has reanimated the interest
in capital controls as a means to stabilize the foreign exchange system
of a country. Among such controls, the Tobin tax represents the most
prominent form. In his Janeway Lectures at Princeton Tobin suggested in
1972 to levy a uniform international tax on all spot transactions involving
the conversion of one currency into the other (published in Tobin, 1974).
There are several other forms of capital controls that ultimately work
like a tax, too. For example, the government may impose a special
minimum reserve requirement on capital inﬂows or a tax on the return of
investments associated with capital inﬂows. Since all these controls add
to the cost of currency trading or reduce the net return of capital inﬂows,
proponents of such measures argue that they can reduce the volume of
destabilizing short-term capital ﬂows and can, thereby, decrease volatility
in foreign exchange markets and augment exchange rate stability. Partly,
such measures are also discussed in the context of the ”new ﬁnancial
architecture” aiming at more stability of world ﬁnancial ﬂows and the
global economy (e.g. Blecker, 1999).
While other forms of capital controls are generally not considered totally
unrealistic to be implemented, the verdict on the Tobin tax is fairly
negative. Two main types of problems are associated with this tax. First,
there are operational diﬃculties. These point to the questions of political
and technical feasibility and the possibilities to evade the tax by shifting
transactions to other countries where such restrictions are not imposed.1
Second, there are problems directly connected with the eﬀectiveness of this
policy tool: does it really reduce the volatility of the exchange rate and
does it cause negative side-eﬀects like reduced growth prospects? These
questions do not just apply to the Tobin tax but are of interest in the
context of other capital controls as well. However, the theoretical literature
examining these eﬀects is fairly limited.2 This paper addresses these
eﬀects by examining how capital controls that aim at reducing short-term
1Since the Tobin Tax is an international tax, the result of the discussion about the
operational problems of this type of capital control is basically that the costs for ﬁnding a
worldwide consensus on all the operational problems would be prohibitively high (Spahn,
1996, p. 25). For an overview of the discussion, see also Haq (1996), and Raﬀer (1998).
2One reason for this is that such capital controls are often directly associated with a
Tobin tax and was rejected by many from the beginning. ”In fact, one might say it sank
like a rock. The community of professional economists simply ignored it. The interest that
occasionally arose came from journalists and ﬁnancial pundits. It was usually triggered
by currency crises and died out when the crisis passed from the headlines.” (Tobin, 1996).
1speculation in foreign exchange markets and that can be modeled as a
tax on international capital ﬂows aﬀect exchange rate volatility, the risk
premium of domestic assets, and the domestic interest rate.3
Jeﬀrey Frankel (1996, p. 71 – 72) uses a simple static monetary model
where the exchange rate is determined by money supply and demand. Like
in our model the expectations of the investors and the speculators are
modeled such that investors reduce and speculators extend the volatility
of the exchange rate. Even though Frankel does not explicitly introduce
a Tobin Tax into the model he comes to the conclusion that such a tax
reduces the variability of the exchange rate.
Buch, Heinrich, and Pierdzioch (1999) use a Dornbusch style framework
and assume that the relative importance of technical traders (or chartists)
in the foreign exchange market depends on the magnitude of the Tobin
Tax. In this context, the chartists are the ”bad guys” who trade in a way
that destabilizes the exchange rate. The ”good guys” belong to a group
of rational agents who know the equilibrium exchange rate, consider the
destabilizing expectations and actions of the ”bad guys”, and also know
the dynamics of the system. Rational agents stabilize the exchange rate.
The implementation of a transaction tax increases the domestic interest
rate. Therefore, foreign investors who have to pay the tax burden get
compensated by a higher domestic interest rate. This could result as for
example Frenkel et al. (2001) show in a lower growth potential for the
domestic economy. The beneﬁts of the Tobin Tax can be seen in the change
of the slope of the saddle path which gets ﬂatter. Hence, overshooting of
the exchange rate and thereby the exchange rate volatility due to future
monetary shocks can be reduced.
Kolck and R¨ ubesamen (2000) assume that the exchange rate path is in-
ﬂuenced by the arrival of news about fundamentals. If new information
occurs, market participants react to these news and change their exchange
rate expectations. They assume that the news process consists of a com-
mon component φt equal for all traders and a trader speciﬁc ’disagreement’
component Ψit. The change of the spot exchange rate (st)i se q u a lt o
∆st = φt + ¯ Ψt (1)
3Capital controls that outright prohibit certain international capital ﬂows are not








where n is the number of traders in the foreign exchange market. As they
point out, a Tobin Tax does not inﬂuence the occurrence of new information
but it reduces the speculative activity of the trader due to higher transaction
costs. Traders act on the same news with a lower expected exchange rate
change. They model this eﬀect by introducing a factor τ into equation (1)
that reduces the change in the spot rate. The variable τ indirectly represents
the Tobin Tax. The higher the tax rate (τ) is, the lower the change in the
exchange rate due to the occurrence of new information.
∆st = τ(φt + ¯ Ψt) with 0 <τ<1. (3)














Ψ) is the variance of φ (Ψ). Since 0 <τ<1, the expected
exchange rate volatility is reduced by the Tobin Tax. Nevertheless,
this ﬁnding cannot be regarded as the end of the story. As Kolck and
R¨ ubesamen point out verbally, their model neglects the inﬂuence of the
Tobin Tax on the overall number of foreign exchange traders. If the number
of foreign exchange traders (n) is reduced by the introduction of the Tobin
Tax a further factor inﬂuencing the variance of the exchange rate has to be
considered in equation (4) which counteracts the primary eﬀect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second part explains
the structure of the model. The third part analyzes the eﬀects on the
risk premium and the interest rate induced by capital controls that can be
modeled as a tax on international capital ﬂows. The last chapter presents
the summary and the main conclusions.
2 The Model
Our model extends the framework suggested by Jeanne and Rose (2002)
who examine the eﬀects of noise trading on exchange rate volatility under
diﬀerent exchange rate regimes. The approach combines a macroeconomic
3monetary model with a standard microeconomic noise trader model.
The actors in this model can be divided into two diﬀerent groups of
traders. One group consists of informed investors who have an accu-
rate knowledge of the mechanism which determines the exchange rate
and, therefore, base their decisions on rational expectations. The other
group of investors consists of noise traders who misperceive the ﬁrst
moment of the return on domestic bonds. This assumption regarding the
defect of a noise trader can be considered as the standard assumption
in the noise trader literature which was introduced by DeLong et al. (1990).
We extend the model of Jeanne and Rose (2002) by introducing a restriction
on international capital ﬂows that takes the form of a price control and
can, thus, be modeled as a tax on the return of domestic assets. Again, an
example is the Tobin tax but our analysis is not restricted to this speciﬁc
measure. We assume that the government, in implementing the capital
control, is able to discriminate between rational acting fundamentalists
and somewhat irrational acting noise traders. This is in line with Buch,
Heinrich, and Pierdzioch (1999) as well as with Frenkel et al. (2001). Our
analysis focuses on the eﬀect of the capital control on the average risk
premium. Through the interest parity condition, the risk premium on
domestic assets aﬀects the domestic interest rate and can, thus, have a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on real capital stock formation and growth of the economy.
Although this argument was made by Frenkel et al. (2001), it is still an
open question in which direction capital controls move the risk premium
given that capital controls might reduce the access of the economy to
international ﬁnancial markets, which increases the risk premium, and, at
the same time, might reduce volatility which dampens the risk premium.
The monetary macroeconomic framework consists of an equilibrium condi-
tion for the domestic (5) and the foreign (6) money market and a purchasing
power parity condition (7):





st = pt − p
∗ +  t. (7)
The variable m denotes the domestic money supply, p the price level
and s the spot exchange rate. While the coeﬃcient β represents the
semi-interest elasticity of money demand, r stands for the domestic interest
4rate. Foreign variables are labeled by an asterisk. All variables except
the interest rates are in logarithms. The level of full employment income
is normalized to unity so that the log value of the income drops out of
the money demand function. The purchasing power party is satisﬁed on
average, so that the exchange rate (s) is simply the ratio of the price
levels plus an i.i.d. normal shock ( ). We postulate that the home country
is a small open economy and the foreign country is large. Furthermore,
we assume that the foreign economy is in a steady state with constant
values of the money supply, the price level and the interest rate. Therefore,
the time index for the foreign variables is neglected in the following analysis.
Solving (5) and (6) for the price levels and inserting them in equation (7)
leads to the exchange rate equation
st =( mt − m
∗)+β(rt − r
∗)+ t. (8)
This equation can be regarded as the standard exchange rate function
of the monetary model. The microeconomic framework is modeled as an
overlapping generations model. All traders live for two periods. In the
ﬁrst period, both types of investors have to balance their wealth between
domestic and foreign bonds. In the second period, investors convert the
proceeds from their investment in the domestic economy to the foreign
currency in order to use it for consumption. Both types of investors are
endowed with the same amount of initial wealth in foreign currency and
possess the same utility function.
An investor (j) maximizes the following CARA4 utility function with respect
to the quantity of money (b
j



















t+1 denotes the end-of life wealth of investor j and the parameter








Trader’s j end of life wealth is inﬂuenced by two factors reﬂected by the
two terms on the right-hand side of equation (10). The ﬁrst term is equal
4The Constant Average Risk Aversion utility function is frequently used in the noise
trader literature. See for example Osler (1998).
5to the wealth at the beginning of life times the foreign interest rate. The
second term is equal to the wealth generated from a domestic investment
which depends on the amount of money (b) invested in domestic bonds and
the (ex-post) excess return per unit of a domestic bond (ρt+1)w h i c hc a n
also be interpreted as the risk premium on domestic bonds and which is
given by:
ρt+1 = rt − r
∗ − (st+1 − st) − τ; τ ≥ 0. (11)
The excess return per unit of domestic bonds is equal to the interest rate
diﬀerential and the gain or loss from the change in the exchange rate. The
new element of the model is the introduction of the capital control for
which we assume that it imposes additional costs to capital ﬂows and, thus,
exerts similar eﬀects as a tax. We model the control as a tax (τ>0) on the
return on domestic ﬁnancial investments. As capital controls often target
short-term capital ﬂows because of their assumed higher volatility, it could
well be possible that they can be designed in such way that they aﬀect the
return on a short-term investment signiﬁcantly more than the return on a
long term investment. Thus, one may expect that the tax matters more for
short-term investment decisions than for long-term investment decisions.
However, we do not make this distinction in equation (11) but rather focus
on a general formulation of the eﬀects of the capital control on the return
of capital inﬂows. The formulation of equation (11) also implies that, in
this paper, we do not have a tax equivalent. Thus we exclude, for example,
outright prohibitions of certain capital ﬂows.
We assume that the two types of traders whom we take into account can be
distinguished in the following way. Informed investors have rational expec-
tations and are homogeneous within their group. Therefore, all informed
investors possess the same expectations regarding the risk premium and the






t(ρt+1)=Va r t(ρt+1). (13)
Noise traders have imperfect knowledge. Although they perceive the second




γ(¯ ρ + νt). (14)
The noise in the market is common across the group of noise traders and
there is no private information in the model as for example in Tauchen/Pitts
6(1983). The variable ¯ ρ denotes the unconditional mean of the excess return
which can also be viewed as an average risk premium. Equation (14) reﬂects
the believe that the government is able to identify the noise traders by
special characteristics and that the capital control can reduce the inﬂuence
of these traders on the exchange rate. The higher the value of the parameter
γ, the higher is the decline in the noise traders’ risk perception due to capital
controls. The noise term νt is a stochastic i.i.d. normal shock common across
all noise traders. Hence the group of noise traders is homogeneous in itself,
too. We assume that the size of noise traders’ misperception is proportional
to the true unconditional variance of the exchange rate:5
Va r(ν)=λV ar(s) with λ > 0. (15)
The average risk premium is equal to the average interest rate diﬀerential
minus the tax rate
¯ ρ =¯ r − r
∗ − τ. (16)
Together with equation (8) this implies that the average exchange rate is
equal to the average money supply diﬀerential, adjusted for the average risk
premium and the tax rate.
¯ s =¯ m − m
∗ + β¯ ρ + βτ. (17)














with respect to b
j
t, i.e. the amount invested by investor j in domestic bonds.
The demand of an individual trader (j) for bonds in the domestic currency











Taking into consideration equations (12), (13), and (19) the utility max-
imizing demand of a rational investor for domestic bonds is given by
5As Jeanne and Rose (2002), p. 545 point out, assuming that Va r(ν) is constant is
implausible, because it would imply that noise traders expect the exchange rate to be
stochastic when it is in fact constant.
6See appendix A1 for the derivation.
7Et(ρt+1)/[αV art(ρt+1)] while the demand of a noise trader can be derived
from equation (14) and (19) as (1−τ)γ(¯ ρ+νt)/[αV art(ρt+1)] . To generate
an equilibrium in the domestic bond market, demand has to equal a ﬁxed
supply ( ¯ B). The demand for domestic bonds consists of the demand of
the group of rational agents and the demand of the group of noise traders,
where N (n) is the number of rational agents (noise traders) entering the
domestic bond market. Equilibrium in the bonds market is given by
¯ B =
NEt(ρt+1)+n(1 − τ)γ(¯ ρ + νt)
αV ar(s)
. (20)
Taking the expectations of (20) at time t − 1l e a d st o
¯ B =
N¯ ρ + n(1 − τ)γ¯ ρ
αV ar(s)
. (21)
Solving for the average risk premium (¯ ρ)g i v e s
¯ ρ =
α ¯ B
N + n(1 − τ)γVa r(s). (22)
The average risk premium varies positively with the risk aversion parameter
(α), the supply of domestic bonds (B) and the variance of the exchange rate
(Va r(s)). As shown in appendix A3 the deviation between the exchange
rate at time t from its mean value is equal to











The deviation of the exchange rate at time t from its mean value depends
on the money supply shock, the purchasing power parity shock ( t), as well
as on the size of the noise trader speciﬁc shock (νt). The distortion eﬀect of
the noise trader speciﬁc shock on the exchange rate will be the larger the
larger the number of noise traders (n). A positive shock will according to
equation (14) increase the expected excess return of the noise trader group.
Therefore, they will make a higher investment in the domestic bond than on
average, which results in an appreciation of the domestic currency. Taking
the variance of (23) leads to (see appendix A4)
Va r(s)=
Va r(m +  )







8The variance of the exchange rate increases with the fundamental variance
of the economy (Va r(m +  )). The introduction of capital controls (τ>0)
induces two eﬀects which inﬂuence the risk premium in opposite directions.
First, it leads to a larger denominator in (24), which reduces the variance of
the exchange rate and tends to decrease the risk premium in equation (22).
Second, capital controls reduce the denominator in equation (22) due to
the fact that they reduce the number of noise traders in the market. Given
the ﬁxed supply of domestic assets, the remaining group of rational agents
needs an incentive to invest a higher share of their wealth in domestic bonds.
The risk premium has to increase so that the rational agents are willing to
hold a larger share of domestic bonds. As there are two eﬀects of a capital
control on the risk premium, the next section examines the optimum tax
level of the capital control.
3 Policy Implications: Computing the Opti-
mal Tax Rate
In order to derive the value of that minimizes the risk premium, we combine




Va r(m +  )







Computing the derivative of ¯ ρ with respect to ξ, we get for the decisive part


































The optimal capital control or tax rate depends on the relative size of the
group of noise traders, on the interest rate elasticity of money demand and
on the ratio λ of the noise term variance and the exchange rate variance.
For example, the larger the noise trader group, the larger is the distortion
due to these traders’ misperception of asset returns. Hence, the capital
control has to be higher in order to limit the noise trading activity to
9an optimal level. At lower levels of the capital control, the dampening
eﬀect on exchange rate volatility more than oﬀsets the eﬀect of a reduction
in the risk bearing capacity of the market. In case that equation (27)
generates a negative value, the optimal control is zero meaning that even
at a low level of τ, the beneﬁcial eﬀects cannot outweigh the negative eﬀects.
We now examine the optimal capital control level for a speciﬁc set of
parameter values.7 Figure 1 illustrates the eﬀect of a capital control on the
average risk premium (¯ ρ) and the variance of the exchange rate (Va r(s)).
This serves to illustrate the eﬀects of the number of noise traders on the
optimal capital control and the linkage between the interest rate induced
by the capital control and the resulting risk premium. Figure 1 illustrates
the eﬀect of diﬀerent capital control levels on exchange rate volatility, the
risk bearing aspect described above and the risk premium. In each case,
we illustrate the eﬀect of the size of the noise trade group by assuming two
alternative number of noise traders in the market. Diagram (a) of Figure
1 highlights three features. First, in the model developed in the previous
section and with no capital controls in place, exchange rate volatility is
higher with a larger noise-trader group. Second, capital controls are indeed
able to reduce exchange rate volatility. Third, the decreasing eﬀect is the
stronger, the larger the group of noise traders is relative to the group of
fundamentalists.
Diagram (b) illustrates the disadvantage of reducing the activities of noise
traders for the economy. As their importance declines, other market partic-
ipants have to hold domestic bonds. This aﬀects how market participants
perceive the risk of these assets and, in our simulations, is reﬂected in what
could be called a risk-bearing factor. Formally, it is the ﬁrst term on the
right hand side of equation (22). As the capital control level rises, this risk
increasing factor rises.
7The parameter values for the simulation are as follows: α =0 .9, ¯ B = 300, Va r(m +
 )=1 ,β =0 .4, λ =1γ =1 ,n = 80, N = 100.
10Figure 1: The Eﬀect of a Capital Control on the Average Risk Premium
and the Exchange Rate Volatility
Solid (dashed) line: Number of Noise Trader n=60 (n=80)
11Diagram (c) shows the combined eﬀect of lower exchange rate volatility
induced by capital controls and increased risk bearing by other markets
participants on the risk premium. The dashed line (relatively large number
of noise traders) shows that the implementation of relatively low capital
control levels reduces the risk premium but relatively high capital control
levels lead to an increase in the risk premium. Thus, there is a positive
optimal capital control level. However, with a lower number of noise traders
(indicated by the solid line), the combined eﬀect leads to a monotonous
increase of the risk premium as capital control levels rise. Hence, the
optimal capital control is zero.
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the number of noise traders
(n), the tax equivalent of a capital control (τ) and the risk premium (ρ).
As the diagram reveals, the optimal capital control level, i.e., the one that
minimizes the risk premium, varies with the size of the noise trader group.
The larger the noise trader group is, the larger is the distortion due to the
misperception of the returns. Hence, the taxing unit has to increase the
tax rate with an increase of the size of the group to limit the noise trading
activity to an optimal level.
One may argue that the minimal risk premium is not the objective of the
policy maker. Since investment decisions depend more on the interest rate
than on the risk premium, one may argue that this should also be the focus
of the policy maker. A slight rearrangement of equation (16) reviews, that
¯ r =¯ r
∗ +¯ ρ + τ. (28)
12Figure 2: The Eﬀect of the Size of the Noise Trader Group and the Capital
Control Level on the Average Risk Premium
The size of the domestic interest rate not only depends on the size of the risk
premium but also on the size of the tax rate. Therefore, it is not guaranteed
that a minimal risk premium will also result in a minimal domestic interest
rate. Although it is possible to derive the ﬁrst derivative of the interest
rate with respect to τ it is not possible to isolate the optimal size of the tax
rate afterwards. Therefore, we simulate the relationship of equation (28)
to show the relationship between the domestic interest rate and the tax rate.
Figure 3 shows the same qualitative characteristics as the diagram in Figure
2. This means that, in general, the optimal capital control varies positively
with the size of the noise trader group. However, Figure 3 reveals that a
relatively small size of the noise trader group can lead to a situation in
13Figure 3: The Eﬀect of the Size of the Noise Trader Group and the Capital
Control Level on the Average Interest Rate
which the optimal capital control level is zero. In this case, the risk and
interest rate reducing eﬀect of lower exchange rate volatility generated by
even a small capital control is more than oﬀset by the negative eﬀects of a
reduction in the risk bearing capacity of the market. As a result, combining
the risk-minimizing combinations of the number of noise traders and the
capital control level yields a line that, if projected to the bottom plane,
runs from the front left area to the back right corner.
4 Conclusion
The combination of a monetary macroeconomic model and a microeconomic
noise trader model gives insight to the eﬀect of a capital control that can
be modeled as a tax for a small open economy. While Buch et al. (1999)
14as well as Frenkel et al. (2001) postulate that the risk premium increases
with the implementation of a Tobin Tax, Kolck and R¨ ubesamen (2000)
show that this kind of tax is able to reduce the exchange rate variability,
leading to a decrease of the risk premium.
We are able to identify two eﬀects which work in opposite directions: On
the one hand, a capital control lowers the variability of the exchange rate
and reduces the risk premium as well as the interest rate of a small open
economy. This eﬀect seems to be the vulnerable eﬀect of the tax, because
it ampliﬁes the growth potential of the economy under consideration. On
the other hand, a capital control reduces the number of noise traders and
thereby the risk bearing capacity of the market. As a consequence, the
group of rational investors as well as the remaining noise traders have to
take a larger stake of the risky asset. As their risk exposure increases,
they demand a higher risk premium which increases the interest rate and
therefore, lowers the growth potential of a small open economy. These two
eﬀects which work in opposite direction is at the heart of our model and
can be regarded as the major contribution of this paper.
As shown in the last section, we are able to derive a formula for the optimal
tax rate, which minimizes the average risk premium. This optimal tax rate
varies with the size of the noise trader group: The more noise traders act
on the market the higher the optimal tax rate, cause the dampening eﬀect
of exchange rate volatility will more than oﬀset the eﬀect of a reduction in
the risk bearing capacity of the market.
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Appendix A1: The equivalence between maximizing the expected
utility and the risk equivalent
The following computations are performed to show the equivalence between










































































The expression under the integral is the normal distribution function and







18Appendix A2: The demand for domestic bonds











































Maximizing (37) with respect to b
j





























Appendix A3: The deviation of the exchange rate from its average
level
In order to derive equation (23) we slightly rearrange equation (22) and get
¯ ρ[N + n(1 − τ)
γ]=α ¯ BVar(s). (39)
Equation (20) can be reorganized as follows:
¯ BαVar(s)=NEt(ρt+1)+n(1 − τ)
γ(¯ ρ + νt). (40)
Equating (39) and (40) leads to
¯ ρ[N + n(1 − τ)
γ]=NEt(ρt+1)+n(1 − τ)
γ(¯ ρ + νt). (41)
Solving (41) for the average risk premium (¯ ρ)w eg e t










(st − mt + m
∗ −  t) − (st+1 − st) − τ. (43)
We now apply the expected value at time t of the expression in equation (43)
at time t and take into account that [Et( t)= t] and that the expected value




(st − mt + m
∗ −  t) − (¯ s − st) − τ. (44)




(st − mt + m





Multiplying this equation by β leads to
β¯ ρ =( st − mt + m





From equation (17), we get β¯ ρ =¯ s − ¯ m + m∗ − βτ . Therefore, equation
(46) can be rewritten as







This shows that the foreign money supply cancels out. After collecting
terms we get





Dividing by −(1 + β) leads to equation (23) used in the text of the paper:











20Appendix A4: Deriving the variance of the exchange rate
Taking into account that Va r(ν)=λV ar(s), the variance of the expression
in equation (49) can be written as
Va r(s)=
Va r(m +  )





(1 + β)2 λV ar(s). (50)
Collecting terms gives






(1 + β)2 Va r(s)=
Va r(m +  )
(1 + β)2 . (51)
Solving for the variance expression gives equation (24)
Va r(s)=
Va r(m +  )







Appendix A5: Computing the optimal tax rate














































N2λβ2 +3 ( 1+β)2N2
9λβ2n2 . (56)
21In order to examine the capital control eﬀect, we only have to consider the
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